Socio-cognitive abilities and cooperative breeding by Burkart, J M
University of Zurich
Zurich Open Repository and Archive
Winterthurerstr. 190
CH-8057 Zurich
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2009
Socio-cognitive abilities and cooperative breeding
Burkart, J M
Burkart, J M (2009). Socio-cognitive abilities and cooperative breeding. In: Röska-Hardy, L S; Neumann-Held, E
M. Learning from Animals? Examining the Nature of Human Uniqueness. New York, 123-141.
Postprint available at:
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich.
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Originally published at:
Röska-Hardy, L S; Neumann-Held, E M 2009. Learning from Animals? Examining the Nature of Human
Uniqueness. New York, 123-141.
Burkart, J M (2009). Socio-cognitive abilities and cooperative breeding. In: Röska-Hardy, L S; Neumann-Held, E
M. Learning from Animals? Examining the Nature of Human Uniqueness. New York, 123-141.
Postprint available at:
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich.
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Originally published at:
Röska-Hardy, L S; Neumann-Held, E M 2009. Learning from Animals? Examining the Nature of Human
Uniqueness. New York, 123-141.
Nature, Language and Culture: Learning from Animals? 
Socio-cognitive abilities and cooperative breeding 
Judith-Maria Burkart, Anthropological Institute, University of Zurich 
 
1. How can we learn from animals about exclusively human traits? 
 
At first sight, there is nothing less promising than looking at animals in order to 
learn about uniquely human traits: if really unique to our own species, the 
investigation of these traits where they actually occur, in humans, is mandatory. 
While this approach is the only means to achieve a detailed characterization of 
uniquely human features, there remain nonetheless important questions which it is 
unable to answer. First of all, it can not provide us the fundamental information 
whether any given feature actually is unique to our own species or not. In principle, 
one would have to test all living species before such a conclusion can be drawn. In 
practice however, we have to be content to exclude the presence of potentially 
unique human features in as many species as possible, but at least in those species 
where they are most likely to occur, i.e. in apes and to a lesser extent, also in 
monkeys.  But even once a feature can confidently be labelled as not occurring 
outside the human context, detailed knowledge about its architecture, functioning, or 
ontogeny during childhood, which is derived from studies of that feature in our own 
species, still offers only a limited view of the whole phenomenon. A comprehensive 
understanding also entails knowledge about its evolutionary origins; whether we can 
determine evolutionary precursors, what they look like and how they are distributed 
among non-human animals. This will inform us about what transitions took place over 
evolutionary time, and perhaps why. 
 1.1 The comparative approach 
Besides identifying those abilities that actually are unique to humans, the most 
straightforward way in which studying animals can contribute to an understanding of 
our own traits is the traditional comparative approach (e.g. Byrne, 1995; Lorenz, 
1950). This approach allows tracing back the evolutionary history of the emergence of 
traits by comparing contemporary living species. It is most commonly applied to 
morphological features, but behavioural traits or cognitive abilities can also be 
profitably examined with this approach. Of course, none of the species living at 
present is an ancestor of any other species. Rather, currently living species share 
common ancestors from whom they then evolved in different directions. The more 
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closely related species are, the more recently they shared a common ancestor. In a 
first step, the comparative approach assesses the distribution of a given trait or 
cognitive ability among different species. If this ability turns out to be present in a 
group of closely related species that share a common ancestor, we assume that it 
was already present in this common ancestor. The rationale for this assumption is 
that from an evolutionary perspective, it is more parsimonious to assume that these 
currently extant species inherited this trait from their common ancestor, rather than 
that this same trait evolved several times independently in perfect parallelism 
(Futuyama, 1997). For example, all great apes, as well as humans older than 18-24 
months, but not monkeys, share the capacity to recognize themselves in a mirror 
(Gallup et al., 2002; Posada & Colell, 2007). According to the comparative approach, 
we can therefore infer that the last common ancestor we shared with the other great 
apes and who lived around 14 Mio years ago (Hacia, 2001; Glazko & Nei, 2003; 
Fischer et al., 2006) already possessed the capacity for mirror self-recognition. 
Likewise, simple forms of object permanence have been found in all simian primates 
tested so far, i.e. in great apes but also in monkeys (Parker & McKinney, 1999; 
Mendes & Huber, 2004). This cognitive trait therefore is likely to have been present 
already in the common ancestor of all simian primates that lived 33 Mio years ago 
(Glazko & Nei, 2003).  
Hence, the comparative approach allows us to characterize the hypothetical 
common ancestors that are differentially distantly related to a target species. By 
comparing hypothetical ancestors in chronological order, until the last common 
ancestor that we only shared with chimpanzees and bonobos, we can trace back the 
likely evolutionary course of the emergence of cognitive abilities that in their final form 
might only be present in humans.  
An inherent limitation of the traditional comparative approach is that it cannot 
inform us about what happened during the last 5-7 Mio years of hominisation, after 
our lineage split from those of other great apes (Hacia, 2001; Fischer et al., 2006). 
Even though this lineage continued to divide into many branches and sub-branches, 
the only species still surviving is our own. While the fossil record nonetheless allows 
us to extrapolate the evolution of morphological traits during this period, the situation 
with regard to behavioural or cognitive traits is far less promising. While some 
archaeological artefacts such as tools, evidence for the use of fire, sophisticated 
burial sites or artistic relicts permit inferring a minimal set of cognitive requirements 
 2
Nature, Language and Culture: Learning from Animals? 
(Parker & McKinney, 1999; Mithen, 2001), the available evidence remains scarce and 
hard to interpret unambiguously, especially for the earlier forms which were less like 
modern humans. 
1.2 An alternative way to learn from animals 
The traditional comparative approach is not the only way in which we can 
learn from animals. If we compare morphological features, behaviours or cognitive 
abilities across many different species, we often observe clusters of traits that 
emerge in some species, but not in others. What characterizes such species is not 
necessarily their close phylogenetic relationship but rather that they shared important 
environmental conditions over evolutionary time and convergently evolved similar 
adaptations in response to them. For example, the reduction of body surface in order 
to minimize loss of energy is a common adaptation to rough climatic conditions and 
can be observed in a variety of species (Meiri & Dayan, 2003), all showing more 
compact body shapes in colder environments than their sister species in warmer 
environments. This compact body shape is not a consequence of common ancestry 
but a convergent solution to the same problem. Similarly, primates living in despotic 
rather than tolerant societies show highly formalized signals of submission, whereas 
those in less despotic societies only show formal dominance signals and those in 
very egalitarian ones do not show any formalized signals at all (Preuschoft & van 
Schaik, 2000). Similarly, rank inheritance from mother to daughter through 
coalitionary support can only emerge in primate social systems that are characterized 
by female philopatry (van Schaik, 1996). Hence, both ecological and social 
environmental constellations can exert specific adaptive pressures that result in 
consistent patterns of consequences, thereby promoting convergent adaptations. 
An alternative to the traditional comparative approach therefore can be an 
attempt to identify the ecological and social constellations that had major impacts 
during our phylogenetic past, preferentially during the last 5-7 Mio years. If some of 
these environmental constellations consistently produce highly similar adaptations in 
diverse species, we can also expect corresponding consequences or response 
patterns in the context of hominisation. Hence, if we find such a response pattern in 
humans but not in our closest living relatives, and at the same time are able to show 
that the respective environmental challenges were met by our species in evolutionary 
time, we do not have to discuss this response pattern as a uniquely human trait. 
Rather, it can be considered as a direct response to some specific social or 
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ecological challenge that would have been expected to arise in any species exposed 
to it. 
One such environmental constellation is cooperative breeding, a reproductive 
system in which individuals other than the genetic parents help rearing the offspring. 
This breeding system presumably provided a crucial context for human development 
and links to our unique cognitive abilities have been discussed (Hrdy, 1999; Hrdy, 
2005b; Chisholm, 2003). In this chapter, I will further explore this alternative 
approach to learn from animals by analyzing the cognitive consequences that the 
cooperative breeding system can have on non-human primates. Specifically, I will 
focus on the cognitive performance and abilities of the cooperatively breeding 
callithrichid monkeys. By characterizing possible functional pathways that might link 
cooperative breeding systems to cognitive functioning, I will try to narrow down the 
role that cooperative breeding might have played during hominisation. 
2. Cooperative breeding and its consequences in non-human primates 
2.1 Correlates of cooperative breeding: life-history traits and behavioural propensities 
 Under a broad definition, cooperative breeding is a reproductive system in 
which group members, other than the genetic parents (alloparents), help one or both 
parents rear their offspring (Hrdy, 2005, p.10). In mammals, cooperative breeding is 
reliably associated with a number of life history traits as well as behavioural 
propensities. A direct consequence of such a reproductive system is that female 
breeders can produce more offspring because the costs of reproduction per single 
offspring are shared among different group members. These saved energetic 
resources can be invested in producing more offspring, by increasing litter size, 
decreasing inter-birth intervals or by producing bigger infants. Moreover, for the 
mother, the independence of previous offspring is no longer a limiting factor for 
producing the next (set of) offspring, because other group members can take over 
the care for older infants when she is already occupied with the new newborns. 
Hence, the cooperative breeding system allows the unusual coexistence of short 
inter-birth intervals and slow maturation of immatures (Langen, 2000; Hrdy, 2005a). 
Cooperative breeding also has consequences at the behavioural level. With group 
members interested in the survival of the same immatures, within-group competition 
is reduced. This mutual interdependence results in highly tolerant social relationships 
and low levels of aggression among group members and (Sutcliffe & Poole, 1984; 
Digby, 1994). Finally, once a cooperative breeding system is firmly installed in a 
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species, the reproductive success of mothers depends on the degree of allomaternal 
assistance that is available. As a consequence, mothers in such species are 
sensitive to both quantity and quality of helpers, and, in extreme cases, abandon 
their offspring if no sufficient allomaternal care is perceived (Hrdy, 1999).  
 Among nonhuman primates, cooperative breeding systems are found in all 
callithirchid monkeys, a family of small neotropical primates, consisting of tamarins 
and marmosets (Rowe, 1996). They typically live in family groups composed of a 
breeding pair and its adult offspring. Instead of leaving the group and becoming 
reproductively active themselves, these adult offspring stay with their parents and 
help raising their younger siblings. Except for breastfeeding, the main caregivers 
often are the father together with older siblings; they carry the infants most of the 
time, and share food with them (Brown et al., 2004), but also cooperate in group 
defence and share vigilance duties (Bales et al., 2000). As a consequence, young 
marmosets, when in distress, preferentially run to the one who carried them the most, 
usually their father or oldest brother, and not their mothers (Kostan & Snowdon, 
2002). The help by fathers and older siblings relieves a significant part of the 
reproductive burden of the females and allows them to increase their reproductive 
output: they normally give birth to twins, and show post-partum oestrus, i.e. they 
become pregnant soon after giving birth to the last offspring, during lactation. 
Social bonds between group members are very strong and not seriously 
threatened even if aggressive conflicts arise. After such incidents, the animals that 
were involved do not reconcile consistently, but usually quickly resume their previous 
behaviours. Reconciliation functions to restore damaged relationships and has been 
found in over 30 primate species. The lack of consistent reconciliation indicates that 
conflicts in cooperatively breeding primates hardly ever damage their stable 
relationships (Aureli & Schaffner, 2006). 
2.2 Cognitive correlates of cooperative breeding in non-human primates 
Besides having life-history and behavioural consequences, cooperative 
breeding might also be associated with enhanced cognitive functioning. According to 
the Cooperative Breeding Hypothesis developed by Sarah Hrdy (Hrdy, 1999; Hrdy, 
2005b), cooperative breeding was a crucial context during human evolution that 
shaped many of our uniquely human features. This hypothesis has the potential to 
explain many of the otherwise puzzling peculiarities of the human reproductive 
system and development, but also why our ancestors, unlike those of great apes, 
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managed to move into and spread across new habitats without losing immatures, 
who are most susceptible to starvation. In addition, this hypothesis also suggests that 
our uniquely complex cognitive abilities, especially in the social context, are linked to 
the cooperative breeding system (Chisholm, 2003). A link between cooperative 
breeding and enhanced cognition and communication seems to be found in 
callithrichids  as well (Snowdon, 2001), giving rise to the question how cooperative 
breeding could enhance cognitive functioning. In the next section, I will first review 
available literature on cognition in callithrichids, including a series of studies 
addressing the question how enhanced cognitive functioning might be achieved in 
these species. I will then use this data to propose different pathways for how the 
cooperative breeding system could have influenced the cognitive functioning of 
callithrichids and finally explore the implications in the context of humans by 
delineating and narrowing down the role that cooperative breeding could have played 
for the emergence of human cognitive abilities. 
2.2.1  Cognitive performance of callithrichids 
 If we assume that cooperative breeding has an impact on cognitive 
performance, we would expect callithrichids to behave more skilfully than other 
monkeys in different contexts. And indeed, accumulating evidence both from 
naturalistic observations and experimental studies suggests that callithrichids perform 
particularly well in the context of communication, social learning, simple forms of 
teaching and cooperative problem solving. Snowdon et al. (2001) reviewed literature 
on communicative and cognitive performance in callithrichids and concluded that they 
tend to show higher vocal plasticity than other monkeys: they modify both call 
structure and usage in different social and environmental contexts and with changes 
in social status, and infants pass through a babbling phase during ontogeny. 
Social learning is another domain in which callithrichids might outperform other 
monkeys. For example, tamarins can learn to avoid noxious foods through 
observation, contrasting with results from other monkeys in comparable experimental 
situations (Snowdon & Boe, 2003). Observational forms of social learning such as 
imitation are very rare in nonhuman primates, despite sayings like “monkey see, 
monkey do”, and their presence has been questioned for years even in great apes 
(Dautenhahn & Nehaniv, 2002). Many taxonomies and definitions of the various 
forms of social learning exist and can be discussed (Call & Carpenter, 2002; Whiten 
et al., 2004). However, there is consensus that observational forms of social learning 
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are the most complex ones and they can be classified according to which aspects of 
the behaviours are copied, e.g. their goal, their result, or the topography of the action. 
Copying of the exact topography of an action  was found in great apes (Horner & 
Whiten, 2005; Whiten et al., 2004), and the only monkey species in which such 
imitational learning has been demonstrated are cooperatively breeding common 
marmosets (Bugnyar & Huber, 1997; Voelkl & Huber, 2000),  
The efficiency of social learning can further be increased if the demonstrator 
engages in teaching behaviour, i.e. if she modifies her behaviour in the presence of a 
naïve observer, thereby encouraging or punishing the observer’s behaviour or 
providing experience, which results in a learning benefit for the observer and is costly 
to the teacher (Caro & Hauser, 1992). The prevalence of teaching in the animal 
kingdom is even lower than that of imitation learning (Leadbeater et al., 2006; Csibra, 
2007), and even in apes, potential instances are scarce. Rather than actively 
teaching their young, typical social learning situations in apes consist of mothers 
displaying increased levels of tolerance towards their curious, eagerly learning 
offspring (King, 1994; King, 1999). The most common context for social learning and 
potential instances of teaching to occur is foraging. However, in apes, even mother-
infant food sharing events are solicited by the begging infant rather than initialized by 
the mother (Goodall, 1986; Nishida & Turner, 1996; Maestripieri et al., 2002; Ueno & 
Matsuzawa, 2004). Nevertheless, mothers might selectively adjust their tolerance 
levels according to the skills or knowledge state of their growing offspring, e.g. by 
being less willing to share food that infants are already able to procure independently 
(Jäggi & van Schaik, in prep. ).  
In contrast, food sharing events in callithrichids can also be initialized by the 
care-giver who holds a food item in an outstretched hand and emits a vocalization 
that results in an infant approaching and taking the food item  (Ferrari, 1987; Feistner 
& Price, 1990; Feistner & Price, 1991; Feistner & Price, 2000; Bales et al., 2000; 
Brown et al., 2004).  This active role of care-givers in food-sharing events, together 
with the facts that food transfers peak around weaning and are most likely to involve 
novel or difficult-to-process items, raise the possibility of this behaviour being an 
instance of teaching. Infants indeed benefit from food transfers by starting to feed 
independently earlier, but also by learning the context in which food-related 
vocalizations are appropriate (Roush & Snowdown, 2001).  
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Rapaport and Ruiz-Miranda  (2002) reported observations from wild golden 
lion tamarins where adults directed immature offspring to locations where hidden 
prey items were located, without retrieving them by themselves. This is a further 
indication that active food-sharing in Calitrichids can be more than a highly canalized, 
fixed and insuppressable response pattern (i.e. holding out food and emitting food 
calls) which is triggered by the encounter of interesting food items. Rather, the 
tamarin mothers showed a more flexible variant of the behaviour, by stopping to 
forage in a knothole before capturing an invisible prey item. They then emitted food 
calls that attracted their offspring who subsequently captured the prey in the 
knothole.  Finally, recent evidence also suggests that callithrichids might be more 
likely than other primates to solve cooperation tasks. Common marmoset dyads 
successfully coordinate their behaviours both locally and temporally, without 
dominants monopolizing the apparatus and reward or forcing subordinates to 
cooperate (Werdenich & Huber, 2002). Furthermore, experiments with cotton-top 
tamarins suggest that they even understand the roles of their partners in cooperation 
tasks, a cognitive ability thought to be present only in great apes  (Cronin et al., 
2005). 
However, there are also domains in which callithrichids are far less proficient, 
not only in comparison to the domains discussed above, but also in comparison to 
other monkeys. With the exception of a single report (Stoinski & Beck, 2001), no 
spontaneous tool use is know from callithrichids, even if simple forms of it can be 
prompted experimentally (Santos et al., 2005; Spaulding & Hauser, 2005). While tool 
use in the wild is indeed very rare and so far as known restricted to great apes and 
capuchin monkeys (Goodall, 1986; Breuer et al., 2006; Moura, 2004), in captivity, 
spontaneous tool use is reported from many primate species, but not from 
callithrichids (van Schaik et al., 1999) and they also have lower innovation rates 
compared to most other primates (Lefebvre et al., 2004). Finally, in a meta-analysis 
over a large number of cognition studies from nine different experimental paradigms 
in strictly non-social contexts, Deaner et al. (2006) found again that marmosets were 
systematically outperformed by most other primates. Therefore, the current picture 
shows that while we find evidence for enhanced cognitive performance in the social 
context, the same is not true in non-social domains. 
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2.2.2 Superior performance or superior ability?  
The apparent dissociation between social and non-social cognitive 
performance in marmosets and tamarins raises the question to what extent this 
unexpected performance is also underlain by related cognitive abilities. 
All the tasks in which callithrichids seem to outperform other monkeys are from 
the socio-cognitive context. To solve such tasks, at least humans heavily rely on their 
Theory of Mind, i.e. the understanding that other individuals possess mental states 
such as perceptions, desires, knowledge or beliefs, and that these mental states are 
responsible for generating behaviours (Heyes, 1998). In teaching, for example, adult 
humans adjust their behaviours to what they believe the infant already does or does 
not know, while the understanding of roles during cooperative problem solving might 
entail the appreciation of what the partner perceives in her situation and from her 
visual perspective, and what her goals and intentions are. Whether any non-human 
primate has a Theory of Mind has been hotly debated for decades after Premack and 
Woodruff (1978) first raised this question. Ontogenetically, human children have 
acquired a fully-fledged Theory of Mind by four years of age (though it will still further 
develop in the following years), when they understand that others can have beliefs 
that do not coincide with the real status of the world, as demonstrated by passing 
false belief tasks (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). Using this understanding of false beliefs 
as criterion, nonhuman primates clearly do not have a Theory of Mind (Call & 
Tomasello, 1999).  
However, long before human children understand beliefs, they grasp other 
mental states such as desires and perceptions (e.g.Wellman & Wooley, 1990; Baron-
Cohen et al., 2000; Perner et al., 2003), leading researchers to state that “it might be 
that developmental psychologists are so obsessed with the false belief tasks just 
because it is one measure of Theory of Mind that children are not very good at” 
(Bloom & Gelman, 2000). Without denying the importance of the milestone that four-
year olds reach in passing false belief tasks, conceptualizing Theory of Mind with 
regard to the developmental trajectories of understanding of different psychological 
states provides a more insightful strategy compared to viewing Theory of Mind as an 
all-or-nothing phenomenon that an individual either does or does not possess (Malle 
et al., 2002). If this conception of Theory of Mind is applied to nonhuman primates, 
the answer to the question whether they do have a Theory of Mind needs revision. 
Among the earliest mental states that human children grasp are visual perceptions, 
and there is increasing evidence that apes possess this component of Theory of Mind 
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as well  (Hare et al., 2000; Hare et al., 2001; Liebal et al., 2004; Bräuer et al., 2005; 
Shillito et al., 2005; Tomasello et al., 2003). 
The performance of callithrichids in socio-cognitive tasks raises the question 
whether they are able to solve such tasks by using a Theory of Mind. Given that the 
all-or-nothing perspective is being abandoned both in developmental and 
comparative psychology, and that visual perceptions are among the easiest mental 
states to grasp, both for children and apes, a fair question to ask is whether common 
marmosets possess this component of Theory of mind and understand visual 
perspective. To test this we used a setting that originally had been used to 
demonstrate the understanding of visual perspective in chimpanzees (Hare et al., 
2000) and in which a subordinate and a dominant individual are facing each other in 
the outer compartments of an experimental room (Fig. 1a, Burkart & Heschl, 2007). 
Two pieces of food were placed in the middle compartment, separating the animals 
from each other. While one piece of food, sitting on top of a T-shaped bar leading 
from one side of the middle compartment to the other, was freely visible to both 
animals, the second one was only visible to the subordinate because it was 
positioned on the subordinate’s side of this T-shaped bar. If the subordinate animal 
understood that the second piece of food was invisible to the dominant partner, it was 
predicted to take the piece of food that was only visible to itself. Subordinate 
marmosets precisely behaved this way and consistently chose the piece of food that 
was exclusively visible to themselves (Fig. 1b). The fact that the T-shaped bar led 
from one side of the experimental room to the other excludes the possibility that the 
subordinates’ choice behaviour was due to a preference to eat near such a bar. In 
addition, subordinates were given a small head start that forced them to make their 
own choice, instead of simply reacting to the choice of the dominant individual who, 
of course, would head for the only piece of food that was visible to her. Furthermore, 
when during a control condition the roles were reversed and the dominant saw both 
pieces of food and got a head start while the subordinate only saw one piece of food, 
dominants did not preferentially retrieve the hidden piece of food, further indicating 
the flexibility of the choice behaviour to the social context. Finally, almost all subjects, 
with the exception of the lowest and the highest ranking, participated both as 
dominant and subordinate in the test, according to their dominance status within a 
given dyad. The flexible adaptation of their behaviour in the test, according to their 
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changing dominance status in different test dyads, confirms their understanding of 
the situation.  
The behaviour of the marmosets in this experiment suggests that they 
understand visual perspective, i.e. what others can or can not see, (Level 1 
perspective-taking, Flavell, 1985). The marmosets therefore behaved like 
chimpanzees who exhibited the same choice behaviour but unlike capuchin monkeys 
that were tested with the same experimental paradigm. Initially, capuchin monkeys 
showed the same behaviour indicative for Level 1 perspective taking as chimpanzees 
as well. However, once they were given a head-start and therefore forced to choose 
by themselves, subordinates started to behave randomly (Hare et al., 2003). Thus, 
the results lead to the conclusion that common marmosets, like chimpanzees but 
unlike capuchin monkeys, possess this simple Theory of Mind ability. Given the far-
reaching implications of such a conclusion, we opted to confirm our findings and 
assessed visual perspective taking in a second set of studies using a different 
experimental approach. 
To validate the previous findings we built on earlier results demonstrating that 
marmosets are able to use cues given by an experimenter in order to locate hidden 
food (Burkart & Heschl, 2006). The ability to use experimenter given cues is usually 
tested with the object choice paradigm in which a subject has the choice between two 
containers, one being baited with a piece of food, while a human experimenter cues 
the baited container, e.g. with tap, point, or gaze cues. Passing object choice tasks is 
notoriously difficult for nonhuman primates (Anderson et al., 1995; Anderson et al., 
1996; Call et al., 2000; Vick & Anderson, 2003). In earlier experiments, we showed 
that marmosets can solve this task if the probability of being successful by chance is 
lowered by offering the choice between more than two containers, in our case nine or 
six containers. Furthermore, this result also indicates that they extrapolate gaze 
direction accurately to a specific target object, rather than co-orienting in a reflex-like 
manner with the experimenter and subsequently taking the first container they 
happen to see. 
We used the same sample of marmosets that previously had been 
demonstrated to use a range of experimenter-given cues, including eye-only cues, 
under the conditions described above in the object choice paradigm. In order to test 
their understanding of visual access, we introduced a number of modifications to the 
test setting (Figure 2a). The animals again had the choice between six containers. 
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However, they were no longer arranged in full view of the experimenter, but attached 
to two sides of a wooden board in a way that each container on one side of the board 
had its counterpart in exactly the same position, but on the other side of the board. 
Facing the edge of the board, the marmoset from its starting position could see all six 
containers, as well as the human experimenter cueing the baited container from one 
side of the board. In order to localize the bait now, it was no longer sufficient to 
correctly extrapolate the gaze direction because it would always indicate two 
containers, the correct one and its counterpart on the other side of the board. In 
addition, the marmoset also had to understand that the gaze of the human 
experimenter cannot penetrate a solid object or in other words, what the 
experimenter actually could or could not see. Surprisingly, the marmosets no longer 
showed an understanding of visual access. While they still extrapolated the gaze 
direction correctly and tended to choose one of the two containers in the line of sight 
of the experimenter, they were not able to discriminate which side of the board the 
gaze was leading to (Fig. 2b). 
Thus, while in one study common marmosets were able take into account the 
visual perspective of other individuals, they failed to do so in a second study. There 
are two plausible explanations for these conflicting results. The first is that common 
marmosets do understand visual perspective but that they were not able to deploy 
this ability in the specific context of study 2. The ecological validity of study 2 was low 
indeed, with marmosets being required to use the gaze of a human experimenter. 
However, the same argument would apply to the previous findings from the object 
choice task (Burkart & Heschl 2006) where the same subjects had been tested 
successfully with a very similar experimental setting that only differed in the 
arrangement of the containers.  
The second explanation is that marmosets are not able to understand visual 
access but somehow managed to solve the competition setting differently, using an 
alternative mechanism. Such an alternative mechanism could consist in the animals 
first following the gaze of the dominant competitor in the opposite compartment to the 
freely visible piece of food. Because the dominant individuals could only see one 
piece of food, they could always only look at this piece of food. If the subordinate 
subsequently treated this piece of food looked at by the dominant as already 
belonging to the dominant, it would avoid it. Hence, it would choose the hidden one 
by default and not because it was invisible to the dominant subject. 
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While gaze following is well demonstrated for common marmosets (Burkart & 
Heschl, 2006), the second step of this alternative mechanism, i.e. that marmosets 
treat a piece of food which is stared-at as already belonging to the looker, needs to 
be demonstrated. To do so, we ran a very easy learning experiment with two groups 
of completely naïve marmosets. Each marmoset had the choice between two pieces 
of food: one that was directly looked at by a human experimenter, and one that was 
not looked at. Marmosets from one group were allowed to take the piece of food 
which was directly stared at, while marmosets from the other group were allowed to 
take the piece of food which was not stared at. If marmosets actually had a 
disposition to treat a stared-at piece of food as already belonging to the looker, the 
learning task should be much easier for the second group, and this was indeed the 
case (Fig. 3). Therefore, our hypothesized alternative mechanism for solving the 
competition setting actually could work. Furthermore, a qualitative re-analysis of the 
marmosets’ behaviour during the food-competition task revealed that their looking 
patterns were also consistent with this alternative mechanism.  
In sum then, the results suggest that even though common marmosets behave 
very skilfully in socio-cognitive contexts, there is no unambiguous evidence so far 
that they also possess a Theory of Mind, or simple precursors to it.  
 
3 How can cooperative breeding enhance cognitive performance?  
  
Accumulating evidence indicates that cooperative breeding and enhanced 
cognitive performance are indeed linked in nonhuman primates. However, it is less 
clear how this effect is mediated on a mechanistic level: whether certain aspects of 
cooperative breeding systems are more responsible for the increase in cognitive 
performance than others, and if so, which ones. Also, we need to understand how 
these aspects interact to finally constitute the functional pathways that lead from 
cooperative breeding to enhanced cognitive performance. I will try to identify and 
explore such potential pathways, and evaluate them by assessing their explanatory 
power with regard to those socio-cognitive domains in which cooperatively breeding 
primates seem to excel. Unfortunately, not much research effort has been devoted to 
compare cognitive abilities and performance between cooperatively and non-
cooperatively breeding primates across domains and sub-domains systematically; as 
a result, we still might overlook important differences in some domains or wrongly 
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infer similarities in others. The potential pathways provided below thus have to be 
considered as preliminary. However, such a tentative sketch might prove to be useful 
in generating testable predictions about the cognitive domains in which differences 
between cooperatively and non-cooperatively breeding primates are or are not to be 
expected.  
A first distinction I will draw is between direct and indirect effects of 
cooperative breeding on cognitive performance, with direct effects being associated 
with the immediate behavioural requirements of the cooperative breeding system. 
Indirect effects, on the other hand, are those mediated through non-cognitive 
consequences of cooperative breeding, such as, increased social tolerance, altered 
motivational predispositions or decelerated ontogenetic development. 
3.1 Direct influences of cooperative breeding on cognitive performance  
In cooperative breeding systems of callithrichids, immediate behavioural 
requirements thought to influence cognitive functioning include the transfer of infants 
from one care-giver to the next, the coordination and alternation of vigilance duties, 
group defence and care-giving activities among group members, and food sharing. 
Necessary mechanisms needed to meet these behavioural requirements rely on the 
coordination of actions between individuals, monitoring of other’s behaviours and 
inhibitory control. 
As a result of multiple care-givers being involved in child carrying, callithrichids 
frequently have to transfer infants from one care-giver to another. This happens in 
the canopy and requires high levels of behavioural coordination, because failed 
attempts may result in infants falling down and dying. Likewise, turn-taking in 
vigilance activities and communal group defence also require strong behavioural 
coordination, which in turn might prime callithrichids for other cooperative activities as 
well, such as cooperative problem solving. In order to successfully coordinate 
behaviour with another individual, both in time and space, it is indispensable to pay 
close attention to what this other individual is doing. This propensity to carefully 
monitor the signals and behaviours of others might explain why tamarins in 
comparison to other non-human primates socially learn to avoid noxious foods, by 
observing spontaneously occurring disgust reactions from conspecifics sampling the 
unpalatable food, as pointed out by the authors of the study (Snowdon & Boe, 2003). 
The difference from other monkeys in socially learning food aversions therefore 
would rather lie in a lack of monitoring the spontaneous behaviours of others, than, 
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e.g., in knowledgeable tamarins intentionally producing signals influencing their 
group members’ behaviours. Furthermore, the mutual need for accurate behavioural 
coordination might also provide the context for more complex forms of vocal 
communication to develop (Snowdon, 2001), maybe starting simply by additionally 
increasing the salience of certain types of central behaviours by accompanying 
vocalizations. 
Another important behavioural component of callithrichid breeding systems is 
food sharing. Food sharing not only takes the form of tolerated theft but also of active 
food offering, predominantly to immatures. Typically, actively shared food items are 
not low-value food that the adults are not particularly keen on and would otherwise 
discard, but highly preferred items such as insects. There are indications that food 
offering is not a completely hardwired response that is automatically triggered 
whenever a prized food item is encountered in the presence of immatures because 
the adult has at least some control over food sharing events. Offering food requires 
from the donor the ability to inhibit the pre-potent action tendency to eat the food item 
by itself. Hence, we would expect that cooperative breeding also improves inhibitory 
control in callithrichids via food offering. In a reversed contingency task, however, in 
which subjects have to grasp for a smaller amount of food in order to receive a bigger 
amount (and therefore have to inhibit the pre-potent action tendency to reach for the 
bigger amount of food), cotton-top tamarins performed no better than other monkeys 
(Kralik et al., 2002).  
3.2 Indirect influences of cooperative breeding on cognitive performance 
In contrast to direct influences, indirect influences of cooperative breeding are 
thought to enhance cognitive functioning mediated by non-cognitive consequences of 
cooperative breeding, such as increased social tolerance, altered motivational 
predispositions toward prosocial other-regarding preferences and information 
donation in the form of teaching, and decelerated ontogenetic development. Here, I 
will only develop the effect of increased social tolerance on visual perspective taking. 
 Within groups of cooperatively breeding primates, social relationships are 
very strong and characterized through high rates of affiliation and tolerance (Aureli & 
Schaffner, 2006). The role of social tolerance for social learning performance has 
been addressed by Coussi-Korbel and Fragaszy (1995) who developed a well-
confirmed model relating social learning to social dynamics among group members. 
Hence, the increased social tolerance associated with cooperative breeding has the 
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potential to increase social learning performance without adding qualitatively new 
cognitive abilities.  
Common marmosets’ behaviour in the perspective taking tasks can also be 
reconsidered in terms of increased social tolerance. The proposed alternative 
mechanism that explains why marmosets passed the competition setting consists in 
first following the gaze of the dominant individual in the opposite compartment and 
then avoiding the piece of food the dominant was looking at. Basically, both simple 
gaze following and treating a gaze as a claim seem to be present in other nonhuman 
primates as well if tested separately. Simple gaze following has been demonstrated 
in a wide range of nonhuman primates (e.g. reviewed in Emery, 2000), and at least 
olive baboons (Vick & Anderson, 2003) and rhesus macaques treat a gaze as a claim 
(Flombaum & Santos, 2005). What could have been the role of cooperative breeding 
then? First, social tolerance may have facilitated the decision of subordinates to enter 
the middle compartment at all. Even subordinate marmosets with their very high 
levels of social tolerance sometimes were reluctant to do so, despite being given a 
small head start. It is conceivable that more competitive species face even higher 
motivational thresholds to do so at all. Second, as discussed above, the signals of 
conspecifics tend to be more carefully monitored in cooperative breeders. 
Subordinate individuals of less tolerant species no doubt have to monitor their 
conspecifics at least as carefully as well because they continuously risk being 
attacked if they interfere with the interests of others. However, their main concern has 
to be: “am I likely to be aggressed or not?” a concern likely to overshadow other 
aspects. In addition, the fact that a direct gaze is usually perceived as a threat in 
most primates makes it more difficult for them to monitor gazing behaviours of 
conspecifics. In contrast, marmosets do not seem to perceive a direct gaze as a 
threat in the same way as other primates do, as mirrored in remarkably low levels of 
gaze aversion. Such a relaxed attitude with directed gaze might also explain why, in 
tamarins (Neiworth et al., 2002) and marmosets (Burkart & Heschl, 2006), it is fairly 
easy to evoke the use of experimenter-given gaze cues in object choice tasks, 
including eye-only cues. 
Finally, if cooperative breeding leads immatures to develop at a slower pace 
than if the mothers alone were responsible for rearing them, as recently suggested 
(Langen, 2000; Hrdy, 2005a; Kramer, 2005), then we can expect a suit of further 
indirect cognitive consequences of cooperative breeding. Delayed maturation 
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provides infants and juveniles with more opportunities for learning in “protected 
environments”, i.e. while still being provided by others with food and shelter and not 
being responsible for predator detection. Thus, the amount of both individual and 
social learning experiences can be amplified, through the increased availability of 
time during the extended juvenile period, and the latter also through the presence of 
multiple, highly tolerant role models.  In addition, this constellation of frequent social 
learning situations and the presence of multiple role models also offers further 
conditions conducive for simple forms of teaching to emerge.  
In evolutionary terms, delayed maturation would relieve one important 
constraint on brain growth. Given that being intelligent produces both survival and 
reproductive advantages, and that intelligence is associated with brain size (Deaner 
et al., in press), the question arises why big brains are not more common in animals. 
The answer is that bigger brains not only convey advantages, but also costs, such as 
extremely high energetic demands that need to be covered, or developmental time 
that is required for the external input-dependent maturation of complex brains (Isler & 
van Schaik, 2006). Hence, all other things being equal, cooperatively breeding 
species with slowly growing offspring are more likely to evolve a bigger brain 
because the associated maturational costs are already paid in advance. 
 
4 Implications for humans 
4.1 Are humans cooperative breeders? 
That humans can be considered as cooperative breeders has been confirmed by 
many researchers (e.g. Foster & Ratnieks, 2005; Hrdy, 2005b; Kramer, 2005; Mace 
& Sear, 2005) by collating a vast amount of affirmative evidence. Most importantly, in 
humans, individuals other than the genetic parents are involved in child care. This 
can be older siblings, aunts and uncles or even unrelated individuals, but perhaps 
grandmothers play the most important role. Compared to great apes, who give birth 
to the next offspring only after 5-9 years (Knott, 2001), i.e. when the previous 
offspring has reached independence, birth intervals in typical hunter-gatherer 
societies are usually about 3-4 years. A four year old human child is far from being 
independent, and it will take her about ten more years to become so. Thus, humans 
show both short birth intervals and slow maturation of offspring at the same time. 
Finally, human mothers also show conditional investment in their offspring, 
depending on the perceived available allomaternal support (Hrdy, 1999). For 
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example, teenage mothers are more likely to provide adequate care the more social 
support is subjectively available to them, usually in the form of the fathers and 
grandmothers of the child to be born  (Hashima & Amato, 1994; Leahy Warren, 
2005). In sum, there is good overall evidence that our ancestors became cooperative 
breeders after they split from the great ape lineage. Can we then, on the basis of 
what we know from other cooperatively breeding primates, infer consequence that 
this breeding system might have had on our own cognitive abilities? 
4.2 Did cooperative breeding influence our cognitive abilities – and how? 
 If we maintain the distinction between direct and indirect influences of 
cooperative breeding on cognitive performance, we first have to identify immediate 
behavioural requirements arising from the human cooperative breeding system. 
Presumably, these behavioural requirements differ not significantly compared to 
callithrichids, and include close behavioural coordination associated with infant and 
child care and the coordination of different activities between group members, both 
leading to enhanced monitoring of the signals and behaviours of others. Likewise, 
indirect effects might also be mediated through similar functional pathways as in 
callithrichids, i.e. via social tolerance leading to altered attentional structures with 
regard to both targets and allocation of time, to enhanced social learning and to 
opportunities for even closer behavioural monitoring, via different pro-social 
motivational predispositions and, on a larger time scale, via the facilitating effect of 
already extended juvenile periods on the emergence of bigger and more powerful 
brains. 
Analyses of the impressive socio-cognitive performances of callithrichids 
revealed that they tend to be based on a slightly different use of abilities that are also 
present in other monkeys, rather then being a consequence of completely new and 
more complex cognitive abilities. What crucially differs then between callithrichids 
and humans may not so much be the ways in which cooperative breeding affects 
cognitive functioning, but rather the  pre-existing cognitive substrate on which the 
selective pressures of this breeding system were acting.  At this point, we can revert 
to the traditional comparative approach, whose task is to explicitly delineate the 
characteristics of evolutionary ancestors. Pinning down exactly when cooperative 
breeding arose during our evolutionary past is a difficult task. However, it must have 
occurred somewhere after the origin of hominins, because with the exception of 
humans, none of the extant apes breeds cooperatively. Therefore, a conservative 
 18
Nature, Language and Culture: Learning from Animals? 
measure for assessing the minimal cognitive equipment on which cooperative 
breeding was acting with certainty is using the modal cognitive skill set of the extant 
great apes as point of reference.  
While the gap in cognitive ability between monkeys and apes is less 
pronounced than one might expect (Tomasello & Call, 1997), there are nonetheless 
important differences, both in the wild and in captivity. For example, apes are more 
proficient tool users than monkeys (Visalberghi, 1997) and show simple forms of 
planning for the future (Mulcahy & Call, 2006). In the socio-cognitive domain, only 
apes are able to recognize themselves in a mirror (Gallup et al., 2002) and their 
observational social learning abilities clearly go beyond those of monkeys, including 
marmosets (Caldwell, 2002; Horner & Whiten, 2005). Finally, as discussed above, 
there is now increasing evidence that they possess some simple Theory of Mind 
abilities such as a understanding that actions are intentional and goal-directed (Call 
et al., 2004) or understanding perceptions (Tomasello et al., 2003; Bräuer et al., 
2005; Shillito et al., 2005). These Theory of Mind abilities in apes are mainly 
deployed in competitive situations, one of the reasons why it took researchers so 
long to demonstrate them.  
As a consequence of cooperative breeding, we might expect that these 
cognitive abilities that already were in place became available in new combinations 
and new contexts. For example, simple planning abilities in food-related activities 
such as tool use would also greatly improve the coordination of activities between 
group members, and already existing sophisticated forms of social learning would get 
a further boost through enhanced social tolerance. The most drastic effects however 
might have been the new possibility to use Theory of Mind abilities also in 
cooperative contexts, with prosocial motivational predispositions playing a key role.  
While I have so far discussed the cognitive consequences of cooperative 
breeding from the perspectives of mothers and allomothers, other authors have 
emphasized the perspectives of infants and children (e.g. Chisholm, 2003; Hrdy, 
2005a). If maternal investment is conditional, children should try hard to engage 
mothers and allomothers to invest in them. This becomes particularly important when 
the arrival of younger siblings further reduces the amount of investment from their 
mothers, at around four years of age. In line with this argument, four years is exactly 
the age at which human children have acquired a basic, fully-fledged Theory of Mind, 
allowing them to better understand and also manipulate the intentions of potential 
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allomothers. Fu and Lee (2007) showed that at around the same age children start to 
show flattering behaviour. The more detailed analysis of six year olds further 
revealed that they are inclined to flatter familiar adults and familiar children and also 
unfamiliar adults, but not unfamiliar children, i.e. individuals to whom they have social 
bonds or who potentially serve as allomothers.  
In sum then, cooperative breeding acting on an already ape-like brain in a first 
step might have allowed our ancestors to use their already sophisticated cognitive 
abilities in new contexts. This is particularly true for the emerging Theory of Mind 
abilities. Over the course of time, the greater advantages of slightly better Theory of 
Mind abilities for our ancestors in comparison to non-cooperatively breeding 
hominids, could have played an important role in the evolution of our fully-fledged 
Theory of Mind. Given that Theory of Mind is strongly associated with executive 
functions (Perner et al., 2002) which in turn are among the main ingredients of 
general cognitive ability in humans (Gray & Thompson, 2004), cooperative breeding 
in humans might even be linked to our cognitive abilities in a much more general way 
than would be expected at first sight. Finally, with the extended juvenile periods 
already in place, we not only had the advantage of higher pay-offs of enhanced 
cognitive capacity, but also of lower costs of this development.  
5 Conclusions 
 
 Looking at animals in order to understand exclusively human properties seems 
counter-intuitive. Nevertheless, there are at least two ways to do so. However, rather 
then refining our knowledge on these properties per se, looking at animals can 
complement this knowledge by informing us about the evolutionary origins of 
exclusively human properties. Besides the traditional comparative approach, a 
second way consists of identifying general principles and regularities between the 
occurrence of environmental constellations and reliably associated consequences in 
animals which also might have had an impact for human evolution. The present 
chapter was an attempt to exemplify this second approach using the case of 
cooperative breeding.  
In nonhuman primates, cooperative breeding seems to be associated with 
enhanced cognitive performance, especially in the social context. However, cognitive 
mechanisms underlying a given surface performance are not necessarily the same, 
and fine-grained analyses are needed to reveal these mechanisms. Such an analysis 
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of the understanding of visual perspective in common marmosets suggests that their 
enhanced cognitive performance is not the result of completely newly emerged 
cognitive abilities. Rather, it seems to arise from the deployment of already existing 
abilities in different contexts and in different combinations. The depiction of different 
potential pathways that lead from cooperative breeding to enhanced cognitive 
performance indicate that the same seems to be true for other extraordinarily skilful 
social behaviours in cooperatively breeding primates as well.  
Hence, the effect of cooperative breeding on cognitive performance strongly 
depends on the starting point, the cognitive equipment of a species who adopts the 
cooperative breeding system. In the case of humans, this was at least equivalent with 
the cognitive abilities of the last common ancestor that we shared with other great 
apes which can be delineated using the traditional comparative approach. Following 
the same functional pathways as in other cooperative breeding primates, this 
breeding system might in a first step have made already existent abilities available in 
different ways and in different contexts. This is most intriguing with regard to simple 
Theory of Mind abilities that supposedly were already in place but mainly used in 
competitive contexts. The effect of cooperative breeding then might have been that 
these abilities became available in other contexts as well, especially in cooperative 
and prosocial ones. Compared to other lineages that stayed within the traditional 
great ape breeding system, this amplified the advantages of slightly better functioning 
Theory of Mind abilities, favouring the evolution of a fully-fledged Theory of Mind as a 
uniquely human feature. At the same time, with prolonged juvenile periods already in 
place, some of the costs for developing the bigger brains necessary were already 
paid in advance, playing a further facilitating role. Finally, due to the reliance of a 
fully-fledged Theory of Mind on executive functions that also play a crucial role for our 
general cognitive ability, cooperative breeding might have had particularly far-
reaching consequences in our species. 
Obviously, the sketch of the effects of cooperative breeding on cognitive 
abilities provided in this chapter is still incomplete and much further research is still 
needed. Nevertheless, pursuing this line of thought both theoretically and empirically 
has the potential to lead to essential insights given the far-reaching consequences 
the cooperative breeding system seems to have had during human evolution.  
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Figure Captions 
 
Figure 1 
a) Experimental setting for testing common marmosets’ understanding of 
visual perspective (after Hare et al. 2001). While the dominant marmoset in the left 
compartment sees only one piece of food because the second one is hidden form its 
view, the subordinate marmoset in the right compartment can see both pieces. If the 
subordinate understands that the dominant from his position can only see the freely 
visible piece of food, it would choose the hidden one. b) The outcome of encounters 
where subordinate marmosets saw both pieces of food and got a small head-start 
indicate that they understand visual perspective. 
 
Figure 2 
 a) An alternative setting for testing common marmosets’ understanding of 
visual perspective. A human experimenter indicates with her gaze which of six 
containers is baited. To identify the baited container, marmosets have (i) to 
extrapolate the line of sight of the human experimenter, but also (ii) to understand 
that her gaze can not penetrate the wooden board. b) Results show that marmosets 
choose the correct position more often than by chance, but not the correct side of the 
board (dotted lines: chance levels). This indicates that they do not understand that 
gaze can not penetrate an opaque object, even though they extrapolate the line of 
sight.  
 
Figure 3 
 Results from the learning experiment indicating that marmosets have a 
disposition to treat a gaze as a claim. The performance of group A, who was learning 
to take a piece of food which was directly stared at, increased over time, while the 
performance of group B, who was learning to take a piece of food which was not 
directly stared at, did not. 
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Figure 1 
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Figure 2 
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